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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-v- • • Case No. 18143 
HOYT GLENNY, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
• 
• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with forcible 
sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-403 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a trial before a jury presided over by the 
Honorable Louis G. Tervort and the Honorable Robert F. Owens, 
conducted on October 28 and 29, 1981, in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court in and for Iron County, Utah, appellant was 
found guilty of forcible sodomy. Accordingly, on December 11, 
1981, appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than five 
(5) years nor more than his natural life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a judgment· and order of this Court 
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 3, 1981, in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah, 
John Thorpe Cooper, thirteen years old, was collecting 
aluminum cans for the purpose of taking the cans to the 
Safeway supermarket for recycling. Cooper's rounds took him 
by the American Motel in Cedar City and to Room 17 where 
appellant, Hoyt Glenny, was residing at the time (T. 49). 
Prior to this date, Cooper had met a~pellant on another 
• 
occasion when Cooper was around the motel searching for cans 
(T. 49). At that time, appellant told Cooper that he had some 
cans and invited Cooper to stop by his room when he was in the 
area again (T. 49). Consequently, when Cooper returned to the 
American Motel on July 3, he went to Room 17 and was invited 
by appellant to enter his room (T. 49). A discussion ensued 
concerning Cooper's can collecting with appellant informing 
Cooper that the boy could have a six pack of beer which was in 
the refrigerator. Cooper removed the six pack from the 
refrigerator, drank a single can of beer and kept those 
remaining (T. 52). Appellant then asked Cooper if he would 
run an errand for him to the Court Hotel where supposedly 
appellant han some clothes (T. 53, 78). Cooper proceeded to 
the hotel on his bicycle but returned shortly to appellant's 
room following his perfunctory visit to the Lunt Hotel (T. 
53). Despite the fact that Cooper was unable to obtain 
appellant's clothes, appellant, after: shutting the door behind 
-2-
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Cooper, gave him five dollars (T. 54). Appellant next asked 
Cooper to sit on his lap (T. SS, 67, 79). Then appellant 
kissed Cooper's lips and began rubbing Cooper's penis through 
his long pants and underwear (T. SS, 56). Appellant continued 
nis fondling of the boy by unzipping Cooper's pants and 
slipping off his undershorts (T. S6). Appellant then invited 
Cooper to join him on his bed where he continued to rub the 
boy's penis (T. S7). Once on the bea, appellant put his mouth 
momentarily on Cooper's penis (T. 56, 57, 62, 68). Cooper 
struggled to get away from appellant but appellant attempted 
to forcibly restrain him by pressing on Cooper's chest (T. 
58). Freeing himself from appellant's force, Cooper put on 
his pants and bicycled home (T. 58). 
Appellant's testimony differs from Cooper's in 
certain respects as to what occurred following the boy's 
return from the Lunt Hotel. Appellant testified that when 
Cooper returned from running the errand to the Lunt Hotel, 
/ 
appellant gave him not five dollars, but two (T. 79, 87). 
Appellant claimed that although he was fairly intoxicated when 
Cooper sat on his lap he could not remember rubbing his hand 
back and forth over Cooper's upper thigh after placing it 
there (T. 80). Appellant testified that he did remember 
kissing Cooper on his forehead and not on the lips, as Cooper 
had testified (T. 80). Appellant stated that his lips did not 
touch any other part of Cooper's body (T. 88). Appellant 
-3-
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further claimed that he did not move from the chair to his bed 
because of emphysema "compounded by drinking" which made 
walking and drinking difficult (T. 80, 81). Appellant 
testified that he never unzipped Cooper's pants, removed 
Cooper's underwear or touched Cooper's genitals (T. 81, 82). 
Following consideration of the evidence, the jury 
found appellant guilty of forcible sodomy (T. 101) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
• 
• 
UNDER UTAH'S STATUTE, PENETRATION IS NOT 
AN ELEMENT IN THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE 
SODOMY. 
Appellant was convicted of forcible sodomy 
consistent with that crime's definition as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann., S 76-5-403 (1953), as amended: 
(1) A person commits sodomy when he 
engages in any sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another person, regardless of the 
sex of either participant. 
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy when 
he commits sodomy upon another without the 
other's consent. 
(3) Sodomy is a class B misdemeanor. 
Forcible sodomy is a felony of the second 
degree unless the victim is under the age 
of 14, in which case the offense is 
punishable as a felony of the first degree 
(Emphasis added). 
-4-
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In his brief, appellant admits that his mouth "was on the 
peni~ of John Cooper, or to the penis of John Cooper, or that 
there was contact between the [appellant's] mouth and John 
Cooper, ••• " (Appellant's brief at 6). The appellant, 
.however, argues that notwithstanding these actions, he cannot 
be guilty of forcible sodomy since there was no evidence at 
trial concerning any penetration or insertion of appellant's 
penis into the victim's mouth. Ry citing a plethora of cases, 
appellant attempts to resurrect penetration as an essential 
element to be proven in any sodomy prosecution. Appellant 
directs this Court's attention to State v. Peterson, 81 Utah 
340, 17 P.2d 925 (1933) in which the Court merely acknowledged 
the parties' stipulation concerning the insertion of the 
defendant's sexual organ into the mouth of the victim. 17 
P.2d at 926. However, in the case at bar we are neither tied 
to a stipulation nor is one required in order to sustain a 
conviction in light of more recent statutory enactments. 
On its face, this state's sodomy statute does not 
require penetration. In Utah, a person is guilty of the crime 
of sodomy simply by engaging "in any sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another ••• " 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-5-403(1) (1953), as amended. Here, we 
have appellant admitting to such involvement between his mouth 
and John Cooper's penis, as well as the testimony of John 
Cooper. Contact or touching is the crucial element in this 
-s-
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state's sodomy definition and not penetration. It is 
established that "any touching" is sufficient. Utah Code 
Ann.,. S 76-5-407 (1981 Supp.), as amended, states in pertinent 
part: 
(2) In any prosecution for unlawful sexual 
intercourse, rape or sodomy, any sexual 
penetration or, in the case of sodomy, any 
touching, however slight, is sufficient to 
constitute the offense (Emphasis added). 
Appellant not only wrongly insists on penetration as 
• 
an element, but also argues that the~Court should rely on the 
common law to help it out of a definitional quagmire. This 
Court explicitly stated in State v. Maestas, No. 17751 
(decided July 21, 1982) that "common law definitions of 
criminal behavior have no application in this jurisdiction." 
Id. at p. 2. The penal code adopted by this state clearly 
abolished all common law crimes. See Utah Code Ann., S 
76-1-105 (1953), as amended. Thus, it is unquestionable that 
appellant's conduct constituted the crime of forcible sodomy 
in that appellant's mouth did touch the penis of a thirteen-
year-old boy, and no alliance to antiquated cases and statutes 
can rescue appellant from the clarity of statutory realities. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT 
REQUIRING TRANSCRIPTION OF CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS. 
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it 
did not require the recording of the .. closing arguments of 
-6-
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counsel. In State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918 (1979), this 
Court addressed the same issue when defendant argued that his 
constitutional right to appeal had been deprived since closing 
arguments were not transcribed. 601 P.2d at 920. The Court 
~xplained that "it is not customary in our Courts, nor in most 
courts, for the reporter to take down the arguments of 
counsel, unless and to the extent directed by the trial 
judge." Id. at 920-921. The trial judge's prerogative of 
transcription is more than custom, it is statutorily 
warranted. Utah Code Ann., S 78-56-2 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
It shall be the duty of the shorthand 
reporter to attend all sessions of the 
court, and to take full stenographic notes 
of the evidence given and of all · 
proceedings had therein, except when the 
judge dispenses with his services in a 
particular cause or with respect to a 
portion of the proceedings thereof ••• 
(Emphasis added). 
Appellant praises the value of judicial records and 
/ 
respondent joins in that observation, but when the trial judge 
has determined that no transcription of closing argument is 
necessary, this decision "deprives no one of any essential 
right." Gray at 921. Absence of the written record does not 
leave future defendants, like appellant, in an environment of 
predictable injustice and unfairness. As this Court observed 
in Gray: 
.. 
-7-
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The trial judge, the defendant, and 
counsel for both sides are all required to 
be present. They are presumably paying 
close attention to what is said in the 
arguments~ and each has unfettered 
opportunity to interrupt at any time and 
request that any portion of an argument be 
recorded, and to voice any objection 
thereto he may desire. 
Id. at 921. Due to the omnipresence of these stabilizing 
factors, the court in Gray warned against nmere shot-gun" 
attacks against the non-recording of ·closing arguments. Id. 
at 921. 
Appellant, in the case at bar, points to no specific 
impropriety committed by the prosecution or the trial judge 
during the course of closing arguments but instead chooses to 
generally protest the lack of reporting. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did err in 
not having closing arguments recorded, it is incumbent upon 
appellant to specifically demonstrate prejudicial error for 
there to be a reversal. The Fifth Circuit, in Addison v. 
United States, 317 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 
u.s. 905, 84 s.ct. 658, 11 L.Ed.2d 605, stay denied, 376 u.s. 
936, 84 s.ct. 791, 11 L.Ed.2d 657, reh. denied, 376 u.s. 966, 
84 s.ct. 1121, 11 L.Ed.2d 984, said: 
••• , the record is sile~t as to any. 
objection made or any motion of any kind 
filed with respect to any alleged 
impropriety during the course of the final 
-8-
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arguments of counsel. Nor have the 
appellants in their original brief filed 
in this case attempted to state that any 
inf lamrnatory or improper comments were 
made during their summations. Obviously, 
even though a failure of the court 
reporter to report the arguments of 
counsel were an error per se, such error 
would not be available to appellants to 
work a reversal without a showing that it 
was prejudicial error. 
Id. at 811. Here, as in Addison, appellant asks this Court 
"to indulge a presumption of prejudicial error without any 
• 
• 
basis," except in the nebulous allegation that the trial judge 
was negligent in not mandating the court reporter's presence. 
State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 542 P.2d 63, 67 (1975). Such 
imprecise objections are insufficient however in presuming 
fundamental and reversible error from a silent record. See 
Fowler v. United States, 310 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1962). 
Moreover, since the record is silent1 this Court is reluctant 
"to reverse a conviction on matters debars the record." State 
v. Starlight Club, Utah, 406 P.2d 912, 913 (1965). In State 
v. Newmeyer, No. 17512 (decided August 19, 1981), the 
appellant argued that the prosecutor's argument before the 
jury regarding the plight of the victim constituted reversible 
error. This Court in Newmeyer stated that in light of the 
fact that the particular remarks were not recorded "[W]e 
cannot ascribe prejudiciality on the second-hand recital by 
defense counsel of what he thought was said and which is not 
before us." Id. at 2. Thus, appella?t's claim of error .fails 
I 
-9-
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either because of the statutory permissibility of not 
recording closing arguments, the non-specificity of his claim, 
or due to the intangible nature of his entire proposition. 
POINT III 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S STATUTE, BY 
BECOMING VOLUNTARILY INTOXICATED APPELLANT 
VOLUNTARILY ABSENTED HIMSELF FROM JURY 
SELECTION. 
The appellant next argues ~hat his absence from the 
• 
courtroom during the selection of the jury was not voluntary; 
therefore his constitutional right to be present during all 
the proceedings of his trial was violated requiring a reversal 
of his conviction. It cannot be argued that a defendant 
enjoys the "basic right" of being present in the courtroom at 
each stage of his trial and that his right to be present is 
"guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Carver, 496 P.2d 676, 
678 (Idaho 1972)1 See also: Lewis v. United States, 146 u.s. 
370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011/(1892)1 Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)1 Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 u.s. 337, 90 s.ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). 
That jury selection is considered an integral part of the 
trial itself "is a matter of settled law." Carver at 678. 
Both united States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 u.s. 908, 89 s.ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed.2d 219 
(1969) and Knight v. state, 273 Ala • .,480, 142 so.2d 899 :· 
-10-
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(Ala. 1962) dealt with the right of a defendant to be present 
during voir dire. Both courts linked defendant's right to be 
present with his ability to assist with his defense. As the 
court in Carver observed: 
The defendant may wish to challenge a 
particular prospective juror for any one 
of several valid reasons, or of which may 
be a negative visceral reaction. That is 
his long recognized privilege and one 
which is important to the trial process. 
Carver at 679. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Snyder 
v. Commonwealth of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 
674 (1934) involving "defendant's right to be present" relates 
to the due process axioms: full and fair opportunity to be 
heard and to defend oneself. Snyder concerned the absence of 
defendant-during a viewing of the scene of the crime by the 
jury. In the court's majority opinion, Justice Cardozo 
explained that the right to be present was violated: 
••• whenever [defendants'] presence has 
a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 
fulness of his opportunity to defend 
against the charge ••• Again, defense 
may be made easier if the accused is 
permitted to be present at the examination 
of jurors or the summing up of counsel, 
for it will be in his power, if present, 
to give advice or suggestion or even to 
supersede his lawyers altogether and 
conduct the trial himself. 
Id. at 105-106 (Emphasis added). 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 
(197~), the defendants were not in the courtroom at the 
beginning of voir dire and this was held to be constitutional 
error in light of the rationale that: 
••• an accused's presence during voir 
dire examination would be important in 
determining which jurors may be acquainted 
in some way with defendant, and vice 
versa. Impartiality and objectivity would 
be aided by the defendant's presence • 
• 
• 
Id. at 679 (Emphasis added). Here again we have a court 
recognizing the defendant's right to be present during an 
important stage of the trial yet couching it in terms of the 
due process expectation that defendant's attendance would be a 
possible asset in mounting and participating in his defense 
and not a distinct detriment. 
This court has recognized this "right which belongs 
to every defendant" to be present but like other courts has 
acknowledged the right's reasonable qualifications. State v. 
Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 42 29 Utah 2d 254 (1973). In Myers, where 
the defendant absconded intentionally from the jurisdiction, 
the trial proceeded without him "since [i]t is a right which 
may be waived under certain circumstances." Id. at 42. Under 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure,§ 77-35-17 (1981 Supp.) such 
a waiver by the defendant is established. The pertinent 
sections provide: 
-12-
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(a) In all cases the defendant shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the 
following exceptions: 
( 1) • • • 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after 
notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being 
tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if 
defendant had been present~ ••• 
(Emphasis added). 
• 
• 
Appellant here asserts that he did not voluntarily absent 
himself from the trial proceedings when he became 
substantially intoxicated the morning of his trial. The 
transcript reveals that the prosecutor had learned of 
appellant's inebriated state "through communications with Mr. 
Thorley· (trial counsel for appellant) and also through the 
Sheriff's·Office·in Cedar City, • • • " (T. 3). The prosecutor 
then explained to the trial judge that defendant's condition, 
if his presence were compelled during voir dire, "would 
certainly be detrimental to his own interests, as well as the 
interest of justice" (T. 3). Defendant's counsel responded 
that "while Mr. Glenny may have become intoxicated 
voluntarily, he has not voluntarily absented himself from this 
proceeding at this point in time" (T. 21). Counsel continued 
by arguing that although defendant's absence was a consequence 
of what he did voluntarily, "· •• he has not directly 
intended to do whatever has happened. in this case" (T. _4). 
, 
-13-
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Such an argument requires an amalgam of tortured 
logic to find that defendant's voluntary choice of becoming 
intoxicated can be considered separate and apart from the 
natural and foreseeable consequences of his conduct which 
-demands no extraordinary prescience, just common sense. In 
short, appellant quite voluntarily and conveniently absented 
himself from the courtroom the morning of the trial via his 
quite voluntary act of imbibing. • • As.this Court held in Myers, 
supra: 
In the administration of justice a court 
cannot be rendered helpless and impotent 
by the devious and cunning ways of 
defendants who might employ a host of 
subtly ingenious strategies to prevent the 
court from convening and proceeding. 
Id. at 42. As the Myers court explained, "To hold to the 
contrary would permit a mischievously inclined defendant to 
profit by his own wrongdoing." Id. at 42-43. 
It is only reasonable therefore to conclude that 
appellant in this case knew or at least should have known that 
his decision to begin drinking prior to his court appearance 
might result in his absence from the courtroom due to the 
court barring him from the proceeding because of the 
prejudicial dangers inherent in his presence. There is no 
statutory requirement, in this state at least, that the 
-14-
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waiver of the right to be present, i.e., the choice to be 
voluntarily absent, be explicitly articulated by the 
particular defendant; thus appellant's irresponsible behavior 
alone was sufficient for the trial court to find that 
defendant had indeed absented himself from voir dire--that 
absence being implicitly definite and undeniably voluntary. 
POINT IV 
• 
THE VICTIM, A 13-YEAR-OLD, WAS COMPETENT 
TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW. 
Under Utah law, only when a witness is under the age 
of ten years must there be judicial determination concerning 
the child's competency to testify. Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-
2 (1953), as amended, provides in pert~nent part: 
The following persons can be witnesses: 
(2) Children under ten years of age, who 
appear incapable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts respecting which 
they are examined, or of relating them 
truly. 
/ 
The victim here, John Thorpe Cooper, was thirteen years old at 
the time of his testimony. The parties stipulated to his age 
(T. ). Thus, under the law, the prosecuting witness, a 13-
year-old, is not included within the application of the "under 
ten" requirement of Utah Code Ann., S 78-24-2 (1953), as 
amended, as appellant contends; but rather falls under the 
-15-
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broader terms of Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-24-1, providing in 
pertinent part: 
All persons, without exception, 
otherwise than as specified in this 
chapter, who, having organs of sense, can 
perceive, and, perceiving, can make known 
their perception to others, may be 
witnesses. • • • 
However, as this court has long recognized, "not age, but 
mental capacity, is the test of competency." State v. 
Zeezich, Utah, 61 Utah 61, 210 P.2d ~27, 928 (1922). See 
also: State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 379, 58 P. 1108 (1899); State 
v. Morasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 P. 571 (1912); State v. Macmillan, 
46 Utah 19, 145 p. 833 (1915); State v. Dickson, 114 Utah 301, 
199 P.2d 775 (1948); State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 
P.2d 174 (1961); State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975). 
To be sure, age is a factor to consider in determining whether 
a child of tender years is competent to testify, but it is 
"not the sole criterion." Sanchez, 361 P.2d at 175. In 
Sanchez, the appellant argued that the ten-year-old 
prosecutrix was not competent as a witness since she 
experienced some difficulty in understanding some of the 
questions posed to her. This Court held, however, that 
although: 
her responses might be viewed by some as 
not entirely satisfactory, ••• it can 
fairly be said that they showed a know-
ledge that it was a good and proper thing 
to tell the truth and bad to lie • 
-16-
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Id. at 175. The Court then explained "Allowance must be made 
for ~he difference in capacities of individuals and no 
particular age or degree of mental ability can be set as a 
rigid standard." Id. This flexibility is possible: 
[b]ecause of the position of the judge in 
proximity to the trial and the witnesses 
he is in an advantaged position to pass on 
these matters, and the question whether a 
child is qualified to be a witness must be 
left largely to his judgment • 
• 
Id. In State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965), 
this Court held that what is essential in testing competency: 
• • • is that it appear that the child has 
sufficient intelligence and maturity that 
she is able to understand.the questions 
put to her; that she has some knwoledge of 
the subject under inquiry and the facts 
involved therein; that she is able to 
remember what happened; and that she has a 
sense of moral duty to tell the truth. 
401 P.2d, 445 at 447. In echoing the Sanchez holding, the 
Court in Smith said that the determination of these tests "is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court ••• His 
ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing 
of abuse.• Id. at 447. 
In the case at bar, there was certainly enough 
evidence establishing John Thorpe Cooper's competency to 
testify. on direct examination, John was asked whether he 
understood the oath and the importance of his telling the 
-17-
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truth, to which he affirmatively responded (T. 48). Moreover, 
Cooper demonstrated knowledge regarding the time, place and 
events surrounding appellant's criminal conduct. He even 
could recall the layout of the hotel room where appellant was 
-
residing on the day of the crime (T. 50-51). 
Thus, the trial court's allowing the 13-year-old 
victim to testify was not an abuse of discretion and the 
record is replete with indicia of codtpetency demonstrating the 
soundness of the trial court's decision to hear the testimony 
of young Cooper. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT GIVING 
INSTRUCTIONS ON PENETRATION OR THE 
VICTIM'S COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY. 
Once again, appellant wrongly avers that penetration 
is an essential element in the crime of forcible sodomy, but 
in Utah no such instruction is relevant since common law 
definitions were abolished through adoption of the criminal 
code. As respondent points out above, contact or touching is 
the crucial element of sodomy and not penetration (See Point 
I, supra). The court therefore did not err in failing to 
instruct the jury as to the common law element of penetration. 
As for appellant's contention that it was reversible 
error for the trial court not to give a cautionary instruction 
-18-
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to the jury regarding the testimony of a minor, respondent 
finds nothing in the transcript to show that one was requested 
and finds no statute mandating the giving of such an 
instruction every time a child of tender years testifies in a 
courtroom. 
In Hendersen v. Kibbe, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 431 U.S. 407 
(1977), Jus~ice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that: 
• Orderly procedure requires.that the 
respective adversaries' views as to how 
the jury should be instructed be presented 
to the trial judge in time to enable him 
to deliver an accurate charge and to 
minimize the risk of committing reversible 
error. It is the rare case in which an 
improper instruction will justify reversal 
of a criminal conviction when no objection 
has been made in the trial court. 
Id. at·154 (Emphasis added). Similarly, this Court in State 
v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 191 (1976), held that one would be 
precluded from claiming error when he "fails to make a proper 
objection to an erroneous instruction, or to present to the 
court a proper request to supply any claimed deficiency in the 
instructions, • n Id. at 193. In so holding, this Court • • 
recognized "the fact that the defendant did not, either by 
submitting written requests, or by oral exceptions, point out 
the claimed error and the remedies for the defects he now 
claims existed in the instructions.• Id. at 192. In like 
manner, defense counsel at appellant's trial made no objection 
-19-
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to the absence of the cautionary instruction at the time and 
thus should be barred from raising any protracted objection 
here. Admittedly, there is an exception to the timeliness 
rule of Kazda, but it is applied "only rarely where there 
appears to be a substantial likelihood that an injustice has 
resulted." Id. at 193. 
In State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112 
(1977), this Court amended the substantial likelihood of 
4 
injustice exception of Kazda to apply only in instances where 
the failure to give certain instructions is so "palpable as 
obviously to reflect prejudice amounting to a denial of due 
process." Id. at 1113. No matter what the chosen 
terminology, the point remains that unless the defendant 
raises a timely objection to the court's failure in giving a 
certain instruction, the subsequent conviction of the 
defendant will not be reversed, except when a showing is made 
of substantial and palpable prejudice. See also Rule 19(c), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rarity of acknowledging 
this exceptio indicates the heavy burden that must be assumed 
and proven by a defendant in order for him to prevail on 
appeal. 
Appellant's assignment of prejudice here goes no 
further than citing three cases: State v. Morasco, supra, 
State v. Zeezich, supra, and State v. Dixon, 199 P.2d 775 
(1948), in which each victim was und~r ten years of age.~nd 
the trial judges felt that the tender years of the victims 
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necessitated a cautionary instruction on the issue of their 
credibility. Here, the victim is a 13-year-old and outside 
the purview of Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-2 (1953), as amended. 
Being appreciably older than appellant's cited youthful parade 
of victims, John Thorpe Cooper and his testimony are not 
subject to the same concerns that a trial judge might have 
with respect to that of a younger witness. Put simply, no 
such instruction was requested, and even though the trial 
judge opted not to give one, that choice is entirely within 
his discretion since one is not required. As this Court in 
State v. Smith, supra, noted, 
After the trial court is satisfied with 
the competency of the witness, the final 
judgment as to the credibility and the 
weight to be given her testimony is for 
the jury. 
Id. at 447. The jury's verdict is evidence of its confidence 
in Cooper's credibility, and appellant's tardy objection 
without more cannot overturn that unanimous belief in 
appellant's guilt. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
Lastly, we are facecd with appellant's argument, 
frequently proffered by others like him, that he was deprived 
-21-
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of his constitutional right to effective counsel and as a 
result his conviction should be reversed or at least remanded 
in order that a new trial be commenced. Appellant sets forth 
a myriad of claims which together amount to no more than a 
~pectrum of speculation and a futile attempt to second-guess 
the strategy of his trial counsel. 
Ever since the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted ··the Sixth Amendment to i9clude the right to 
• 
effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 u.s. 
45, 53 s.ct. 55 (1932), there has been debate over what 
standard of performance is demanded by that constitutional 
guarantee. Most of the circuits, either implicitly or 
explicitly, have abandoned the "sham and mockery" test first 
enunciated in Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 
667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 u.s. 889, 65 s.ct. 1576, 89 
L.Ed. 2002 (1945) and have replaced it with the higher 
standard of "reasonably competent assistance" of counsel. See 
Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980) for evolution of 
the standard. In adopting this new test, the Tenth Circuit in 
Dyer stated that the "Sixth Amendment demands that defense 
counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a 
reasonably competent defense attorney." Id. at 278. 
Recently, this Court stated that the four-pronged test coming 
out of the Dyer standard requiring that defendant: 
(1) establish proof of the ineffecti~.eness of counsel, (2.) 
show that the ineffectiveness was due to the inadequacy of 
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counsel and not as a result of trial strategy, (3) demonstrate 
that better representation might have had some effect upon the 
result of the trial, and (4) prove that motions and objections 
which were not made would not have been futile if raised, does 
have its parallels in Utah. State v. Malmrose, Utah, No. 
17661 (decided June 22, 1982). 
In State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976) this 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment tight to effective counsel 
specifically entitles defendants to: 
• • • the assistance of a competent member 
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent 
with the ethics of the profession. 
554 P.2d 203, ·204. The McNicol court also stated that: 
••.• A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or 
ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of 
such must be a demonstrable reality and 
not a speculative matter. 
Id. at 203, 204 (Emphasis added). Respondent believes that 
appellant's argument of ineffective representation has no 
basis in reality and thus is relegated to delusional 
hindsight. 
It is quite clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
does not interfere with an attorney's "legitimate exercise of 
judgment, as to trial tactics or strategy." Id. at 205. In 
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State v. Wood, Utah, No. 16486, (decided May 13, 1982), we are 
reminded again that: 
Trial tactics lie within the 
prerogative of counsel and may not be 
dictated by his client. Decisions as to 
what witnesses to call, what objections to 
make, and, by and large, what defenses to 
interpose, are generally left to the 
professional judgment of counsel. 
Id. at p. 28 of Wood opinion. See also: State v. Gray, Utah, 
601 P.2d 918 (1979)~ State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 
(1978); State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976). It is 
this reminder that appellant has either forgotten or ignored 
in his desperation to find a conviction tainted by reversible 
error. 
Appellant's contention that trial counsel should 
have moved for a change of venue into a supposed "liquor 
liberated" forum such as Salt Lake County lacks any empirical 
foundation. Trial counsel probably concluded that the choice 
of venue to remain in Iron County would certainly not harm 
appellant's chances of acquittal since some of the jurors 
might be acquainted with appellant. The decision to remain in 
Iron County was reasonable with nothing being revealed during 
voir dire examination to the effect that appellant was not 
being tried before a fair and impartial jury. 
By the same token, appellant's claim that trial 
counsel should have asked the prospective veniremen whether 
-24-
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they possessed any bias toward "imbibers" falls under the 
strategic prerogatives alotted defense counsel under McNicol 
and its progeny. It is quite reasonable to conclude that 
defense counsel wanted to de-emphasize appellant's penchant 
~or alcohol and believed that a specific question during voir 
dire might only increase the grade of defendant's already 
formidable evidentiary incline. 
In considering the validity of appellant's next 
claim of counsel's inefficacy, the Court need only turn to the 
trial transcript to discover that trial counsel {who is also 
an officer of the court) acted reasonably in notifying the 
court (to ·the exclusion of the jury) of the reason for his 
client's absence and that he impliedly did move for a 
continuance when he argued that appellant had not voluntarily 
absented himself from the proceedings when he became 
voluntarily intoxicated and he "would desire his presence 
during the choosing of the jury" (T. 4). Despite this 
argument, the trial judge found that appellant had voluntarily 
absented himself from voir dire (T. 4, 5). 
Finally, appellant complains that an expert witness 
was needed to persuade the jury that alcoholics have a 
diminished sex drive. Once again, appellant asks this Court 
to invade the realm of trial strategy which it has never done. 
Such an Orwellian intrusion into defense counsel's tactical 
decisions would strip the legal prof~ssion of its independence 
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and integrity. Appellant has offered nothing to show that if 
such an expert did testify, the result of the trial would have 
been different. Indeea, such testimony would have been only 
marginally helpful given the victim's testimony in this case. 
Again, the decision as to what witnesses to call is within the 
province of defense counsel. Appellant makes other claims, 
but we need not consider them here since an affidavit which 
was attached as an addendum to appellant's brief and which was 
• 
subsequently stricken by stipulation from appellant's brief 
formed the basis of those otherwise groundless claims. 
When juxtaposed to the de rninimus standard of 
"reasonable competence" reaffirmed in Malrnrose, respondent 
submits that appellant's claims of ineffective legal counsel 
fail because of their speculative nature or because his claims 
involve trial strategy. Respondent appreciates the frustra-
tions of Justice Crockett when he observed in State v. Harris, 
30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (1974): 
In regard to the defendant's 
contention that he was denied effective 
counsel: we are impelled to remark that 
it is nothing less than shameful that our 
law seems to have degenerated to a point 
where whenever an accused is convicted of 
crime, the charge of incompetency of 
counsel is, with ever increasing 
frequency, leveled at capable attorneys 
who have given entirely adequate service 
when the real difficulty was that he had 
a guilty client. In this respect also 
defendant had his entitlement of adequate 
representation by capable and 
conscientious counsel. 
-26-
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517 P.2d at 1315. Here, we too have the cry of foul in the 
guise of indiscriminate claims of inadequacy, and those facts 
cannot erase the salient realities of a guilty appellant and 
competent defense counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant alleges error on several points to obtain 
a reversal of his conviction and sentence. Respondent has 
shown the weakness or illogic which Attaches to each of 
appellant's allegations by relying on clear statutory 
language, recent case law, or the trial transcript. For all 
of the above reasons, respondent respectfully urges this Court 
to affirm appellant's conviction and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October, 
1982. 
General 
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